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Abstract
Social innovation projects commonly refer to operationalized theories of
change to inform strategy and to deliver intended outcomes. Community-
based sustainability campaigns, as one example, emphasize the elicitation of
pro-environmental activities and decision-making among members of a host
community, drawing on mainstream psychological theories of behaviour,
motivation and cognitive (mental) processes. Locating an argument within the
neurobiological base of structure determinism, this paper explores how
theories of change for sustainability campaigns might be reimagined through
the lens of enactive theory. Following a brief introduction to the enactive
model of embodied cognition, implications associated with trying to
operationalize the model to inform how theories of change are mapped out
and used in sustainability initiatives are discussed. The paper concludes by
drawing on insights from approaches to psychotherapy, which also
endeavoured to apply this model of mind, and considers these within the
strategic context of sustainability initiatives and public engagement.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Humanity has reached an existential crisis point with
evidence indicating potentially catastrophic climate
change becoming overwhelming, necessitating an imme-
diate and radical shift in our modus vivendi. Some of this
is already underway. International policy frameworks are
being negotiated to promote Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs; General Assembly, 2015), and regional gov-
ernance mechanisms in Europe and elsewhere continue
to support investment in low carbon infrastructure.
Increasingly over the last few decades, ‘third sector’ and
community-based groups have self-organized to offer
members of the public opportunities to participate in
localized sustainability projects. Indeed, many
community-based initiatives now receive support from
charitable donations and funding contracts, and it is
becoming common for post hoc evaluations to be
included as a funding condition.
But evaluations without theory have little probative
value to either project learning or to the discipline of
evaluation itself (Chen, 1990). Indeed, as Chen argues, to
determine the value or merit of a project, there must be a
theoretical basis, a coherent model of change and how it
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happens. Because Chen's call for an end to theory-free or
black-box evaluations, there has been a blossoming of
interest within the evaluation discipline to develop, test
and reflect on how change happens and is accounted for,
and indeed, this informs the methodology of process eval-
uations (H.M. Treasury, 2011). If anything, new entrants
to the discipline may be overwhelmed by too many theo-
rists (Parsons, 2017), and tracking alignment between a
project's putative theory of change and its subsequent
outputs and outcomes relative to objectives and key per-
formance indicators is now common practice (Morra
Imas & Rist, 2009; Rogers, 2014).
A theory of change is a log-frame breakdown of how
an initiative defines the problem of interest (here,
enhancing local community sustainability), develops a
response, attempts to engage relevant stakeholders in
processes of change and how it defines success
(Stame, 2004; Weiss, 1995). A theory of change often
models responses to deeply complex, dynamic and
chronic conditions, typically characterized as wicked
problems (Rittel & Weber, 1973), of which human sus-
tainability is but one example. As a result, how local ini-
tiatives model how change is thought to work and how it
might be defined in terms of processes, inputs and out-
puts is a topic of interest for evaluation and policy
research purposes.
There is no singular community-based local sustain-
ability initiative model however (TESS, 2016), and initia-
tives generally involve multiple combinations of focused
activities, across scales of space and time, with a range of
funding and staffing arrangements. What unites this dis-
parate sector though is the planned elicitation of pro-
sustainable behaviour among the stakeholders with
whom it engages. These intended processes of engage-
ment and elicitation are frequently modelled using theo-
ries of change, which draw heavily on psychological
accounts of learning, cognition and behavioural triggers.
But these accounts are not unproblematic. Indeed, in
light of what is at stake, such models would surely bene-
fit from a critical review to avoid supporting insignificant
outcomes or, worse, merely the illusion of change
(McDonough & Braungart, 2002). Moreover, although
studies evaluating the processes and impacts of local sus-
tainability initiatives have emerged over the last decade
(e.g., Mayne, Darby, & Hamilton, 2012), few studies
directly engage with the implicit models of cognition
upon which many theories of change are based (Arvesen,
Bright, & Hertwich, 2011; McFarlane, 2006).
Studies demonstrate the variable predictive value of
psychological models of behaviour change
(e.g., Bamburg & Möser, 2007; Steg & Vlek, 2009), and
two of the more frequently cited models of behaviour
change in the sustainability literature—the theory of
planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1991; Armitage &
Christian, 2003) and value-belief-norm theory (VBN;
Stern & Dietz, 1994)—both show limited predictive value.
These models are summarized in Table 1. For example,
structured equation modelling of correlation coefficients
of eight determinants of pro-environmental behaviour
drawn from a meta-analytic literature review found that
when a hybrid model of TPB and norm activation model
(NAM; Schwartz, 1975, 1977) was fitted to available data,
the impact of all variables was mediated by the determi-
nant ‘intention’, whereas the impact of problem aware-
ness was mediated by norms and beliefs (Bamburg &
Möser, 2007; Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Indeed,
TABLE 1 Summary of two widely-used approaches to pro-environmental behaviours
Model Source Characteristics
Theory of planned
behaviour (TPB)
Ajzen (1991);
Armitage and
Christian, (2003)
• General deliberative theory of behaviour
• Intention to act is determined by the interactions among attitudes (a broad measure of
how favourable a behaviour will be), subjective norms (willingness to comply in
conjunction to the degree of social pressure) and perceived behavioural control
(opportunity and capability to behave in the intended way).
• Behaviour is therefore taken on the basis of cost–benefit analysis.
• The model is unable to account for (self-defeating) habitual behaviours.
Value-belief-norm
(VBN) theory
Stern and
Dietz (1994);
Stern (2000a)
• Extends norm activation model (Schwartz, 1975, 1977), which was developed to account
for altruism to pro-environmental behaviour as expressing a personal norm activated by
linking consequences of behaviour and ascription of responsibility
• Often measured by means of the new ecological paradigm (NEP; Dunlap, van Liere,
Mertig, & Jones, 2000), which associates value orientation and personal norms
• Pro-environmental behaviour derives from a moral orientation, typically transcendental
or biospheric values.
• Like TPB, VBN is unable to account for habits and evidences stronger predictive value
in low-cost situations.
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the meta-analysis suggests that pro-environmental behav-
iour is the product of ‘self-interest and pro-social motives’
(Bamburg & Möser, 2007, p. 21). But neither TPB nor
VBN can account for self-defeating habits and offer pre-
dictive strength only under relatively low-cost situations
(Klöckner, 2013; Steg & Vlek, 2009). Despite the wide-
spread reliance on activities that appeal to values and atti-
tudes as triggers for pro-environmental action, these are
statistically weak predictors of behaviour (Stern, 2000b).
Another widely referenced model, especially in the
transition town literature, is Prochaska's transtheoretical
model (TTM) of change, originally developed to explain
how addicted persons change their behaviours
(Prochaska, DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992). By framing
humanity's path dependence and lock in to an oil-based
economic and technological infrastructure as an ‘addic-
tion’, Hopkins (2008) proposes the TTM as a way to
understand the processes involved in transformative
change. The model of addiction is reflected by the move-
ment's use of a 12-step guide to community change
(Connors & McDonald, 2010), a framework directly echo-
ing that of self-help addiction support formats
(e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous). Johnstone (in Hopkins,-
2008) notes how TTM depicts change as a gradually
unfolding process beginning with one's precontemplation
to change and evolving through a series of phases until
change is acted upon and achieved.
Even in the absence of a fully articulated theory of
change, approaches to eliciting pro-environmental behav-
iours are replete with terminology, which draw on
implicit theories of mind and cognition. For example, ini-
tiatives may seek to appeal to the values people hold
about the environment (e.g., Kaiser, Woelfing, &
Fuhrer, 1999) or seek to shift people's attitudes in support
of pro-environmental perspectives (e.g., Kollmuss &
Julian, 2002) or even encourage people to co-identify with
nature (e.g., Dunlap, 2008). Moreover, methods of
engagement also return variable outcomes; for example,
the widespread use of ‘bottom up’ participatory methods
for community engagement (e.g., Bass, Dalal-Clayton, &
Pretty, 1995; Green & Hunton-Clarke, 2003) was initially
purported to be good practice, yet a recent literature
review suggests disappointing results (Reed, 2008).
It is evident then that theories of behaviour change
vis-à-vis environmental problems are complex and
wide-ranging and show highly variable results
(Gardner & Stern, 2002) and as a consequence may
leave some practitioners confused about which models
to adopt, how to implement them and how they are to
be assessed (Ika, 2012). Is this because, as Lakoff (2010)
argues, our latent epistemology struggles to respond to
the complexity of the sustainability crisis? And if so,
then what—if anything—will change as a result of
doing more of the same (Burns & Worsley, 2015;
Ramalingam, 2013)?
Much of the psychology imported into the theories of
change used by sustainability initiatives is based on a
modernist paradigm, seemingly ill-equipped to deal with
the dynamic non-linearity, multiple perspectives and self-
reflexiveness that characterize complex systems (Rohde,
2010). As a result, this poses the legitimate question
about the validity and viability of common psychological
models to meaningfully contribute to addressing the chal-
lenges of climate change and our unsustainable ways of
living. This is a non-trivial matter. Our epistemological
framework shapes how environmental problems are con-
strued, the identification of available opportunities to
ameliorate, mitigate and adapt to the dynamic future
conditions envisioned and the sense-making capacities
by which a direction of travel is ascribed significance by
stakeholders in local initiatives. In recognition of this,
this paper locates cognition at the epicentre of transition
and sustainability evaluation and policy research.
Theories of mind, thinking and epistemology have
long been the preoccupation of philosophers, and the
nature of mind is one of the five ‘perennial questions’
Baumer (1977) traces in his history of modernity. In
traditional Western epistemology, mind and body are
essentially different matters, and the latter has gener-
ally been devalued and associated with the corpus of
the Earth (Stephens, 2013). It is somewhat ironic then
that the prime challenge to sustainability concerns the
body itself. We warm and shelter our bodies in build-
ings that tend towards thermal inefficiency, we feed
our bodies with food bearing embedded carbon foot-
prints and we transport our bodies to work and else-
where using fossil fuel-based infrastructures. Although
sustainability initiatives do focus on these facets, gener-
ally, the theories of change favoured are based on psy-
chological models that have little to say about the
body per se. Moreover, in a note of caution to those
who imagine a technological fix to the problems of
sustainability, McDonough and Braungart (2002, p. 62)
observe that technological solutions pursuing sustain-
ability via improved eco-efficiency do not ‘reach deep
enough [because the solution] works within the same
system that caused the problem in the first place [and]
presents little more than an illusion of change’.
In the following section, an explicitly embodied the-
ory of cognition—enaction—is introduced. Thereafter,
some of the implications of applying enaction to theories
of change are considered, and inspiration for doing so is
drawn from therapeutic practice rooted in enaction. The
paper concludes by reflecting on how local sustainability
initiatives might utilize enactive theory in reflective and
engaged practice.
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2 | COGNITION AS LIVING: A
BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO
ENACTION
There is something more fundamental to successful tran-
sitions to sustainability than just getting the technology
right. If ‘[e]nvironmental destruction is a complex system
in its own right—widespread, with deeper causes that are
difficult to see and understand’ (McDonough &
Braungart, 2002, p. 66) and if the ‘crisis of the environ-
ment is […] a wider challenge to our ways of knowing
and acting in the world—including the relationship
between various forms of expert knowledge and under-
standing’ (Irwin, 1995, p. 182), then as Hukkinen (2014,
p. 108) puts it, the way ‘we theorize about the mind mat-
ters a great deal […] for the politics of knowledge in envi-
ronmental issues’. The relationship between cognition in
the escalating crisis of sustainability and on the genera-
tion of viable solutions cannot be neglected.1 It is becom-
ing increasingly evident that theories of change
informing how sustainability interventions are designed
and implemented based on linear and reductionistic
models are conceptually inadequate to contend with the
complexity presented by the sustainability crisis
(Lakoff, 2010).
Our models of thinking, mind and cognition and
what we say we know, all lie at the heart of the current
sustainability crisis. Yet surprisingly little critical review
of the models of cognition (and epistemology) prominent
in matters of sustainability has been undertaken to date.
Our models are still based on computational metaphors
of mind, functionalist accounts that favour input–output
descriptions in which the mind traffics in symbolic repre-
sentations of the external world (e.g., Fodor &
Pylyshyn, 1981), all of which come together in a ‘Carte-
sian theatre’ (Dennett, 1991) as the putative seat of con-
sciousness and action.
This paper introduces a very different account of cog-
nition, drawing on enaction and the neurobiological par-
adigm of structure determinism. Two points stake out the
degree to which enaction diverges from the computa-
tional metaphor: The first is that enaction describes a
radically embodied cognition—cognition is the neuro-
phenomenological engagement by a living unity with its
world: ‘Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as
a process is a process of cognition’ (Maturana &
Varela, 1980, p. 13; original emphases). Indeed, the
‘whole organism is a vehicle of meaning’ that ‘is gener-
ated within the system for the system itself […] and at the
same time consumed by the system’ (Colombetti, 2010,
pp. 147–148). To live then is to be cognate. Cognition is
skilful living, of successfully conserving autonomy until
doing so is no longer viable, at which point the organiza-
tion falls apart and the system dies.
The second marker of divergence is that, in the
enactive account, cognition is an active process of engage-
ment with the world; the mind is not a passive recipient
of perceptual data in the form of symbolic representa-
tions (Thompson, 2007; Varela, Thompson, &
Rosch, 1991). Enaction posits autonomous systems,
which enact an environment, one coherent with that
organism's own structure, whereby the organism's own
biology structures and thus determines what the organ-
ism can meaningfully interact with in the world. In other
words, an organism brings forth its own world of signifi-
cance. One is minded of von Uexküll's (1982, 1992) para-
digmatic tick with its three capacities by which it
sustains itself, seemingly oblivious to anything else
beyond its umwelt where only that of significance to the
tick is selected for attention.
The implications of this are that the significance
attributed to the perception of events is those of the
observer, not inherent to what is observed. Varela
et al. (1991, p. 150) describe this as between ‘knower and
known, mind and world, stand[ing] in relation to each
other through mutual specification or dependent
coorigination’. The only product of a living being's
(autopoietic) organization2 is itself and affords no distinc-
tion between being and doing (Maturana &
Varela, 1992). Unlike the computational metaphor,
which posits that behaviour is the result of a complex
chain of events involving symbolic representations and
cognitive attributes (e.g., motives, beliefs and attitudes),
the enactive model is a full emergence of the organism
within the world without the intervening switch between
perception circuits and action circuits. An enactive unity
is an operationally closed system, its identity ‘specified by
a network of dynamic processes whose effects do not
leave the network’ (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 89). The
unity interacts intimately with the medium with which it
is coupled, and although different aspects of the system
1This claim is reasonably consistent with the observation that post-
normal science links epistemology and governance while eschewing
‘truth’ concepts in favour of those that can offer descriptions of ‘quality’
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). For the purposes of this discussion, the
examination of those conditions that select out the adequacy of a
campaign to trigger community changes is simultaneously a qualitative
description of a process that supports emergence rather than a
condition that makes recourse to an objective world of truth (what
Maturana, 1988, would refer to as objectivity without parentheses).
2Organization refers to the set of all possible relationships of the
organism's autopoietic processes, a space in which the organism ‘can be
realized as a concrete system’, the dimensions of which ‘are the
relations of production of the components that realize it’ (Maturana &
Varela, 1980, p. 88).
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are affected differently by environmental disturbances,
what is triggered is constrained by the unity's structures,
not by the environment. The unity is engaged in compen-
satory changes to conserve homeostasis (autonomy). The
unity responds to perturbations (irritation from an ‘out-
side’ distinguished by an observer) but only insofar as the
‘environment resonates in the [unity] by means of the
[structures] which the system itself produces’
(Vanderstraeten, 2005, p. 473; added emphasis).
This then is the canonical theory of structure deter-
minism: The structure of a unity specifies what is ‘picked
up’. There is no transfer from an outside to an inside; the
unity's structure constrains or determines the responses
that are proper to it in its conservation of autonomy.3
There is no room in this account for instructional interac-
tions: A unity cannot be compelled to do anything outside
of that, which its structure determines as compensation
in maintaining its homeostasis. Organisms sense only
their own state changes, and no parts of an external
world are mapped internally by sense organs. Indeed,
from the perspective of the nervous system, there is no
‘outside’. Instead, enaction describes ‘complex, causally
spread processes encompassing the brain, the body, and
the environment [which] self-organize in opportunistic
ways to produce appropriate performance under tight
temporal constraints’ (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 46).
So what of language, relations and society? What of
these third-order couplings? Over time, unities and their
media structurally couple, in that the reciprocal and
recursive compensations to perturbation mutually shape
and condition the unity and its medium. We are, after all,
each environments for the other. The ontogenic history
of recurring couplings gives rise to a recurring pattern of
relations shaped specifically as the ongoing interactional
domain, which emerges as a third-order coupling giving
rise to a linguistic domain, or umwelt, and in humans, it
is this linguistic domain of recurring reciprocal interac-
tions from which languaging emerges. Indeed, to lan-
guage is what it means to be human, for ‘it is by
languaging that the act of knowing, in the behavioral
coordination which is language, brings forth a world’
(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 234). We constitute our-
selves ‘in language in a continuous becoming that we
bring forth with others’ (Maturana & Varela, 1992,
p. 235). Rather than the transmission of information,
languaging is a particular form of action, the coordina-
tion of coordinations of behaviours. It concerns our ways
of living together. Because as humans we share structural
commonalities, we have in common our accounts of how
our own bodies are operating in connection with the sur-
rounding medium within which we persist. These opera-
tions lead us to reach consensus in perceiving the world
in approximately similar ways, a consensus that gives rise
to the abstraction of reciprocally specifying coordinations
of behaviours into the domain of ‘principles’, ‘laws’ and
other forms of discourse. Notions of free will and inten-
tions, attitudes and values are, from this perspective,
interesting concepts and within particular applications
may have currency but remain semantic distinctions or
subordinated phenomenological domains that do not
intersect with autopoietic operations (Maturana &
Varela, 1980). What we construct in the linguistic domain
may not have any relation to what our structure does as
it continues its autopoietic processes of conserving our
autonomy. Agreements made in the consensual domain
of linguistic coordination have no currency in the domain
of autopoietic operations. This means that we cannot
legitimately claim that third-order couplings, such as
human social systems, are autopoietic or that they engage
in structural couplings as would biological unities.
Maturana and Varela (1980, p. 120) explain that ‘[p]
henomenologically the linguistic domain and the domain
of autopoiesis are different domains, and although one
generates the elements of the other, they do not inter-
sect’. Behaviours are governed ‘by our composite struc-
tures, which are continuously in the process of adapting
to internal and external perturbations. Terms like
“control,” “self-control,” and “choice” are language meta-
phors applied after the fact. They are not operational real-
ities’ (Efran, Lukens, & Lukens, 1990, p. 50; original
emphasis). Similarly, social systems are, from one per-
spective, a cluster of autonomous unities participating in
co-ontogenic networks, whereas, from a second perspec-
tive, social systems also exist ‘as unities for their compo-
nents in the realm of language’, which require structural
coupling in the living domain, where unities ‘operate
with language and [are] observers’ (Maturana &
Varela, 1992, p. 198).
3 | MODELLING THEORIES OF
CHANGE: IMPLICATIONS OF
ENACTIVE COGNITION
In addition to the models of change discussed previously,
many social innovation and transition-oriented initiatives
also adopt an information-deficit approach to engaging
with stakeholders and eliciting change. This approach
3However, as noted in a comment on an earlier draft of this paper by
the first reviewer, operational closure may itself be a source of the
sustainability crisis, a perspective attributable to Luhmann, who applied
a number of neurobiological concepts to social systems. Although
interesting, because Luhmann's interpretation of Maturana's work has
already been comprehensively discussed in a series of critical articles by
Mingers (1992, 2002, 2004), and as the origins of the sustainability crisis
are not the current concern, this theme is not elaborated here.
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proposes that rational minds will make informed deci-
sions and act accordingly when provided with accurate
information (de Best-Waldhober & Daamen, 2009;
Heeren et al., 2016). Here, a computational metaphor of
cognition is implicit—if only the correct information can
be given to people, then the assumption is that they will
use this to inform their decisions. When cognition is
framed as effective action, the concept of learning
changes from an acquisition of facts to the generation of
novel meanings (Bopry, 2001).
But because we are structurally similar, exposing peo-
ple to information pertaining to climate change and ways
of mitigating and reducing the causes of global warming
may trigger changes among some participants in a cam-
paign, but ultimately, any changes the participants
undergo is a function of the participants' own structures
and the nature of the various interactions they engaged
in during the process. It is not due to any information
they have been provided with. As we saw in the previous
section, because there are no instructive interactions,
only orthogonal, a unity is constrained by its structure,
which determines how it will interact with the environ-
ment and the stimuli to which it appears to respond.
From the perspective of sustainability, this is a crucial
point: Sustainability is not so much about our ‘addiction’
to fossil fuels but the history of our couplings and the
way we language what is significant and of value in how
we conserve our autonomy. Any sustainability initiative
will need to do more than just raise awareness. It will
need to find ways of engaging members of the public in
ways that trigger structure determined changes consistent
with pro-sustainability-related outcomes. This is not as
esoteric as it sounds, and even reflects a common-sense
view, as evidenced by a 2014 community-scale low car-
bon sustainability initiative in the United Kingdom.
When the initiative recognized that their initial efforts at
engaging members of the local community were gaining
little traction, the project team relaunched their initiative
and this time started with what the local population had
defined as priorities and then linked these to the initia-
tive's original sustainability objectives (Cinderby, Haq,
Cambridge, & Lock, 2014). Interpreting this from an
enactive perspective, the initiative engaged the local com-
munity by becoming a medium with which community
members could potentially realize their own priorities
and ways of living and thereafter linked these with pro-
ject priorities. This means that sustainability initiatives
should be appropriate to the communities they are
involved in. That is, they should offer a qualitative fit
between the receptivity of the host community (Jeffrey &
Seaton, 2004), and this will likely enhance the initiative's
capacity to trigger meaningful responses congruent with
more sustainable outcomes.
The foregoing example also exposes a latent tension
in the construction of theories of change. Such theories
not only rely on computational metaphors of cognition
but also tend to traffic in models of change as if it is done
to someone what was referred to as instructional interac-
tion earlier. Clearly, enactive theory does not uphold
such a notion: Change is not something that can be pre-
determined, and it certainly is not done to anyone. Argu-
ably, a theory of change informed by enactive cognition
is not a recipe for inducing change at all. Rather, it is a
description of how spaces may be created within which a
range of dialogic opportunities are presented, only a few
of which might trigger compensatory structural change
for the participating public (Mitchell, 2017). What this
means is that some approaches may gain traction engag-
ing local communities using a range or menu of
workshop-based activities, town centre static surveys or
investing in infrastructural changes, such as an increased
number of connected and safer bicycle lanes and associ-
ated support facilities. The point is to provide a range of
potential triggers that members of the participating com-
munities might select (Gardner & Stern, 2002) and to pro-
pose multiple pathways, which link investments in
healthy lifestyles, weight reduction and low carbon emis-
sion campaigns, for example, to extend the range of
attractors to become incorporated into the production of
identity of the local communities.
Fortunately, the application of some of these ideas
to sustainability transition campaigns does not start
from a blank slate. As Richardson (in Richardson &
Tait, 2010, pp. 32–33) observes, the point is not ‘that
all methods that do not capture complexity to a com-
plete extent are useless, but that we need to develop
an awareness of how our methods limit our potential
understanding of such systems’. In recent years, there
have been several approaches to engaging people in
pro-environmental behaviour changes that specifically
evoke resonance with people's identities and link
behavioural changes with the conservation of coher-
ence and continuity of identity (e.g., Lakoff, 2010;
Stets & Biga, 2003). In the linguistic domain, we as
individuals and as members of social groups or ‘clubs’
participate in the realization of a world premised on
negotiated and shared meanings. Membership in
particular ‘clubs’ or linguistic (languaging) communi-
ties is very much a part of what people include in
characterizing who they are, their identity. Studies also
confirm the importance of identity in understanding
attitudes and behaviours with respect to the environ-
ment (e.g., Clayton & Myers, 2009;Crompton, Brewer,
Chilton, & Kasser, 2010; Crompton & Kasser, 2009), a
perspective that pro-environmental initiatives often
overlook (Crompton, Brewer, Chilton, & Kasser, 2010;
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Crompton & Kasser, 2009), even though the
dynamics of these remain controversial as
Blancke (2018) observes.4
4 | DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that instructional interactions are illusions
of control that participating members of the public
undergo change as a result of their own structures, which
compensate for systemic perturbations in the mainte-
nance of homeostasis and the conservation of autonomy.
How might these claims be operationalized to enable
local sustainability initiatives to use enactive theory to
elicit meaningful change to our collective modus vivendi?
We can answer this question by leveraging in findings
from another context, the raison d'etre of which concerns
behaviour change—the psychotherapeutic relationship.
Indeed, during the 1980s, the systemic family therapy
community took up the work of Maturana and Varela in
significant numbers, interpreting it for their own needs
(Parry, 1982; Ruiz, 1996). When therapy is disentangled
from its associations with medicalized cures and recast as
an ‘inquiry into frameworks of meaning’, it becomes an
‘educational process’, a space within which ‘clients are
invited to clarify their options and desires, evaluate the
costs of actions, distinguish between the actual and the
hypothetical, and speak plainly and responsibly about
who they are’ (Efran, Lukens, & Lukens, 1990, pp. xvi,
49). The meaning of therapy itself changes from being a
means to ‘treat’ someone to become a context ‘in which
to devise and test better ways to live’ (Efran, Lukens, &
Lukens, 1990, p. 197). Arguably, there can be no doubt
that living sustainably is a ‘better way to live’, and on this
basis, local sustainability initiatives may even serve a
community therapeutic role (Mitchell, 2017).
The therapists who adopted the ideas of enaction and
structure determinism were faced with the task of inter-
preting a biological account of living systems in terms of
a praxis with which to induce change in others.
Maturana himself eschews the idea of a method arising
from his work (Maturana & Poerksen, 2004), because
instructive interactions are irrelevant to structure deter-
mined systems conserving their autonomy. However,
approaching problem construction and resolution from
the perspective of psychotherapeutic engagement with
clients, Efran et al. (1990, p. 95) observe that the ‘prob-
lem-determined system […] comprises all those who “lan-
guage” an issue in similar terms’. Indeed, therapy is itself
a collaboration among problem-dissolving linguistic
systems of meaning (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988;
Goolishian & Anderson, 1987). Local sustainability initia-
tives may indeed model themselves on such an approach,
and rather than seeking to engage local communities in
order to introduce changes to the way they live, instead
might offer spaces for facilitating community-scale thera-
peutics, an opportunity to engage in conversations about
better ways of living together in the shadow of the
looming sustainability crisis.
This underscores languaging as the means by which
our consensual realities5 are maintained. Our consensual
realities are composed of multiple and nested embodied
contracts of reciprocal and recurring agreements emerg-
ing from the complex network of linguistic domains
woven together in countless interfaces of neuro-
phenomenological structural coupling with the world
(Di Paolo, Cuffari, & de Jaegher, 2018). Arguably,
describing our ‘orchestrated patterns of living in contrac-
tual terms rather than simply in terms of expectations,
understandings, belief systems, or assumptive structures’
actually ‘conveys the active, urgent nature of these
arrangements’ that we rely upon to ‘sustain the social
order’ (Efran, Lukens, & Lukens, 1990, pp. 116–117). As
noted above, for humans, we know ourselves and others
in language, and contracts are expressed in language as a
demand for conserving ways of being, given as a declara-
tion of how our systems operate within the context of an
explanation for how the world works and our attributions
of punctuated causality.
From the vantage point of local sustainability initia-
tives as community therapeutic spaces, how might theo-
ries of change drawing on enactive theory be modelled?
Who determines what is important and what changes,
why and to what degree? How do the conversations
among stakeholders about such issues shape and inform
the coordination of coordinations of behaviours, which
cohere participants as a community? As referred to
above, structural coupling suggests that, over time and
prolonged interaction, a unity and its medium become
increasingly ‘fitted’ to each other. An initiative cannot be
too different from the language community, or it will
likely be rejected; but if it is too similar to the commu-
nity, it will exert little influence. To be effective then, an
initiative needs to continually break up patterns of think-
ing in order to facilitate the emergence of novel meanings
(learning) while maintaining a careful balance between
difference and sameness. But, for an initiative to remain
4The first reviewer is thanked for bringing this article to my attention.
5It should be noted here that in this context, ‘consensual’ pertains to
‘the domain of interlocked conducts [behaviours] that results from
ontogenic reciprocal structural coupling between structurally plastic
organisms’ (Maturana, 1978, p. 47). It is not a description of consent or
homogeneity.
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effective, it also has to keep reinventing itself because the
processes of learning are not about the methods used but
the coupling between initiative and the participating pub-
lic, which gives initiatives plenty of scope to experiment.
It is worth being aware that members of the public and
members of the initiative interact in languaging accounts
of how the world is, how it could be and means of induc-
ing change. These are activities of participatory sense-
making, a view that understands individuals as both
related (structurally coupled) and simultaneously self-
organizing and conserving their autonomy (de Jaegher,-
2013; de Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). For a local initiative
to engage members of the public, it may be necessary for
it to provide a third space within which to facilitate con-
versations around what is valued locally and why. How
these priorities are subsequently associated with any of
the initiative's own funded objectives depends on the skil-
ful conservation of autonomy on the part of the initiative,
which maintains its viability with respect to its
medium—the local host community.
What this means then is that theories of change as
applied in local sustainability initiatives do not reduce to
a collection of transferable methods. When informed by
an enactive cognitive account, at best, they offer sites for
continual renewal and experimentation. They do so by
creating opportunities for orthogonal interactions, which
break down existing patterns of languaging to allow for
the creation of new meanings as a process of learning.
The initiative might define the parameters of interest for
sustainability in terms of supplies and sinks—energy,
food, economics, waste and governance—and engage
host communities to evaluate how such challenges are
already being resolved. The initiative engages members
of a local community in conversations, which explore
and test how these extant approaches might be linked to
more sustainable outcomes. Indeed, an enactive account
of cognition reorients the relation between human
thought and the world away from representations of the
world (the Cartesian theatre) towards an active engage-
ment in the generation and maintenance of a world. This
is immediately an ethical positioning because we are all
each responsible for the worlds we bring forth with
others, and these are maintained through the ongoing
consensual coordination of coordinations of behaviours.
Change happens when participating members of that lin-
guistic community (or ‘club’) are engaged in languaging
their worlds in ways that have dissolved the original
problem construction.
When cognition is construed as effective action
within a specific domain, it becomes apparent that as
humans, we have not engaged effectively with our
world, which has culminated in the current existential
threat and underscores the prescience of
Bateson's (1972) critique of science as neglecting to fac-
tor in the influences of our epistemology on our ways
of living. Of course, introducing a new model of cogni-
tion introduces a series of challenges to how sustain-
ability initiatives might operationalize this to develop
theories of change. The challenge is exacerbated by its
own theoretical basis in autopoietic and neurobiology
and how it eschews formulating a set of techniques to
be employed regardless of context. Nevertheless, what
is of paramount importance is the coupling between
the unity and its medium. Over time, between unity
and medium, a linguistic domain coheres as a viable
space (a niche) within which the unity conserves its
autonomy. If we are to conserve our own autonomy
going forward, then the introduction to an alternative
model of cognition may be necessary to get us out of
the crisis of our own making, and the foregoing is a
necessarily brief overview of a rich and complex theory
base, and there remains much to do to develop this
work further as a way of thinking about the doing of
sustainability.
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